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when he is not.
Plea bargaining has a necessary function in the criminal justice
system in that it terminates many criminal prosecutions with a
guilty plea. This helps the courts to process more cases, which in
turn tends to lessen the large backlog of cases experienced today.
This function is becoming more important every day and an expan-
sion of the scope of plea bargaining, but maintaining the rights of
the defendant, does not seem unrealistic. The inclusion of a judge
in the bargaining process, in an appropriate case, also does not
seem improper. Such action would eliminate an extra step in the
system and would benefit both the state and the defendant in that
the matter could be disposed of immediately rather than proceed-
ing to the court and informing the judge of what had transpired at
the bargaining session.
JAMES A. WILKE
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
The most significant case of the Term in the area of domestic
relations considered the termination of parental rights of a natural
father to his illegitimate child, State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran
Social Services) In that case Jerry D. Rothstein sought to gain
custody of a child born out of wedlock. Rothstein swore he was
the natural father of the child, and had made his desire to take
custody of the child known to the mother prior to the child's birth.
However, the mother kept the birth and whereabouts of the child
secret, until after her parental rights had been terminated at a
hearing of the LaCrosse County Court. The child had subsequently
been placed in a prospective adoptive home.
Because Rothstein had been given no notice of this hearing to
terminate parental rights, he sought to vacate the county court
order and petitioned that court for a hearing concerning his right
to care, custody and control of the child. The county court denied
his petition, and Rothstein appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme
Court for a writ of habeas corpus to determine his rights to legal
custody of the child.
In an earlier case,2 the court had determined that Rothstein, as
I. 59 Wis. 2d I, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973).
2. State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56
(1970).
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father of an illegitimate child, had no parental rights and was not
entitled to notice of a hearing to terminate his parental rights; the
court felt that such a termination of parental rights without the
consent of the father met the statutory requirements of Wis. Stats.
Chapter 48, 3 and did not offend the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Chief
Justice Hallows rigorously dissented from the majority position.4
In Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services,5 the father appealed
the decision of the Wisconsin court to the United States Supreme
Court. While on appeal, the Supreme Court in Stanley v. Illinois'
held that the father of illegitimate children did have parental rights.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court decision was vacated and remanded
due to the Rothstein7 appeal, with reconsideration to be based
upon: the Stanley8 decision, the goal of completing the adoptive
proceedings in this case, and the fact that the child had lived with
an adoptive family for a period of time.
Upon remand, the court referred the matter to a referee for a
factual hearing. The referee found that Rothstein was the father
and a fit person to have custody, but that the court should not grant
him custody because the best interests of the child were served by
remaining with his adoptive parents. In the Lewis9 decision, the
court considered the validity of the referee's findings and deter-
mined that:
1) It is not possible to give legal custody by adoption without
a proper termination of parental rights.
2) Denial of the parental rights of a father due to mere illegiti-
macy violates his constitutional rights to equal protection under
the law.
3) Termination of the rights of a natural father to an illegiti-
mate child requires actual or constructive notice of a hearing to
meet the requirements of due process.
4) To constitutionally meet the requirements stated by the
United States Supreme Court in Stanley," until the legislature
3. WIs. STATS. § 48.02(11) (1969). "'Parent' means either a natural parent or a parent
by adoption. If the child is born out of wedlock, 'Parent' means the mother."
4. State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 47 Wis. 2d 420, 437, 178 N.W.2d
56, 65 (1970).
5. 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
6. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
7. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
8. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
9. State ex rel Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 59 Wis. 2d 1,207 N.W.2d 826 (1973).
10. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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changed the violative sections in Wis. Stats. Chapter 48, the court
required that notice given to the father of an illegitimate child must
be the same as that given to other parents," and secondly that
consent or termination (with proper notice) of the rights of both
parents must be achieved before a child may be adopted. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court vacated the county court judgment, and
Rothstein was entitled to have a hearing to determine the termina-
tion of his parental rights as natural father.
The importance of the Lewis" decision is clear. An attorney
representing parties who seek to become adoptive parents must
make a thorough inquiry into the nature of the consent of each
natural parent, or the notice given of the hearing to terminate
parental rights. This is to protect the rights of the clients as pro-
spective adoptive parents, and to avoid the disruptive effect upon
both "adoptive parents" and the child from the subsequent re-
moval of the child from his adoptive home. Before proceeding with
adoption, the attorney must determine whether the adoptive
agency followed the constitutionally required steps to protect the
natural parents.
Other cases in the August, 1972 Term considered problems in
the area of the custody of children. Freye v. Freye, 3 for example,
involved parties who entered into a stipulation giving the mother
custody of their minor children when a divorce judgment was
sought. After a number of years the father sought to gain custody
of the three children; the trial court found both to be fit parents
and able providers. It transferred custody of the two oldest children
to the father, but the youngest child was to remain in the mother's
custody. Upon the father's appeal of the custody of the youngest
child, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated its belief that once full
inquiry into child custody has been made, a court ought not recon-
sider the matter again until there is a "substantial or material
change in the circumstances of the parents or of the child." Then
a change in custody may be made if "in the best interest of the
II. WIS. STATS. § 48.42(1) (1971).
The termination of parental rights under § 48.40 shall be made only after a hearing
before the court. The court shall have notice of the time, place and purpose of the
hearing served on the parents personally at least 10 days prior to the date of the
hearing, or if the court is satisfied that personal service, either within or outside the
state, cannot be effected, then such notice may be given by registered mail sent at
least 20 days before the date of the hearing to the last known address of the parent,
if an address is known, and by publication thereof. . ..
12. State ex rel Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973).
13. 56 Wis. 2d 195, 201 N.W.2d 504 (1972).
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child.""4 However, the court made it clear that the change of cir-
cumstances rule is not the proper test where the original custody
award was based upon a stipulation, since all relevant factors were
not considered. The court felt that the decision of the trial court
had improperly applied the change of circumstances rule in favor
of the mother in this case, and remanded with instructions that
each parent have an equal burden of proof to show that custody
with that parent was in the best interest of the youngest child.
Goembel v. Goembel5 also involved a father who desired to
obtain custody of a child from the mother; however, a complete
determination of the fitness of both parents had been made in the
divorce action (both parents had been deemed fit), and custody had
been awarded to the mother. At a later hearing upon an order to
show cause, the custody of the child was transferred to the father,
prompting this appeal by the mother.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court asserted that where a complete
determination of the fitness of parents in a divorce action found
both to be fit to have custody of a child, the burden of proof is upon
the party seeking to change the custody award. The basis of such
a change in custody must be from evidence showing sufficient
differences in the circumstances of the parents or the child to war-
rant such a transfer of custody. Much of the reasoning for the the
trial court's transfer of custody was based upon alleged indiscre-
tions of the mother, which had been considered in the original
divorce action; the trial court had nonetheless deemed the mother
fit to have custody of the child. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
found the mere fact that the child was now two years older was
not a material change in circumstances, and there was no proof
that the mother's actions had any adverse effects upon the child.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the county court order and
the mother was permitted to maintain custody of the child.
In another case, Ponsford v. Crute,1 the court considered a
custody dispute between the grandparents and father of a child. In
this case, the plaintiff/father and his wife had been married and
had one minor child. They had separated and the father had been
drafted into military service, with the mother having custody of the
child. While the father was serving in the military, the mother died
of accidental causes; after returning for the funeral, the father was
14. Id. at 196, 201 N.W.2d at 506.
15. 60 Wis. 2d 130, 208 N.W.2d 416 (1973).
16. 56 Wis. 2d 407, 202 N.W.2d 5 (1972).
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not permitted to take the child by the maternal grandparents. The
plaintiff began a habeas corpus proceeding to obtain custody, but
the petition for the writ was denied because the court determined:
1) The grandparents were fit and proper persons to have cus-
tody.
2) The father was not suitable to have custody due to the na-
ture of his military service obligation, his past indiscretions, and
his failure to support the child.
3) The best interests of the child required remaining with the
grandparents until the father showed he was fit to have custody.
Upon receiving an honorable discharge from military service,
the father again sought custody of his child. Upon showing the
court that he had paid most of his delinquent support payments,
and that he had married the woman with whom he had been indis-
creet, his request for custody was granted by the court with no
visitation privileges granted specifically to the gransparents. The
grandparents then brought an appeal.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court made it clear that the best inter-
ests of the child were the controlling considerations in a contest for
custody between the parents of a child. However, before a trial
court may deprive a natural parent of custody, there must be a
showing that the parents are unfit or unable to adequately care for
the child. Since at the time of the action the father was a fit and
suitable parent, able to adequately care for his child, custody was
properly awarded to him. However, the matter was remanded to
the trial court to set reasonable visitation privileges for the grand-
parents. The court also would permit a temporary delay in the
change of custody if the circumstances indicated it would be in the
best interests of the child. For example, a trial court determination
to delay the custody change until the end of a school term, rather
than during the term, would be a legitimate delay.
Two cases in the Term, Krause v. Krause17 and Fritschler v.
Fritschler,8 considered the duty to continue to make support pay-
ments when the parent with legal custody removes a child from the
jurisdiction of Wisconsin without permission, thereby ending the
other parent's visitation rights. In Krause,9 the parents were di-
vorced and the custody of their children was granted to the mother
by the trial court; the father was to pay $100 per month for support
17. 58 Wis. 2d 499, 206 N.W.2d 589 (1973).
18. 60 Wis. 2d 283, 208 N.W.2d 336 (1973).
19. Krause v. Krause, 58 Wis. 2d 499, 206 N.W.2d 589 (1973).
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of the children. The mother subsequently moved to Florida with
the children, without informing the court or the father. After the
father stopped making support payments, he sought an order to
show cause why the divorce judgment shouldn't be amended to
award him custody of the children, and to terminate support pay-
ments. The trial court cancelled the delinquent support payments,
but ordered the father to pay the clerk of courts the same amount
of monthly support ($100) to be held in trust for the children, until
the mother received court permission to remove the children to
Florida, or the mother returned with the children and again
made Wisconsin her home. The father appealed the trial court
order to continue to make support payments, but the Wisconsin
Supreme Court felt the trial court had properly exercised its
discretion in this respect. The basis for the decision was the
father's duty to support his children, which rests upon his status
as parent, and that a divorce doesn't affect the relationship or
duties of a father to his children. In order to modify a divorce
judgment, such as to modify support payments, there must be a
material change in circumstances; in addition, the modification
must be in the best interests of the children. While the wife's mis-
conduct in frustrating the visitation rights of the father was clearly
a change in the circumstances of the parties, the elimination of
support was not in the best interest of the children. Also, the trial
court was enabled to disburse these funds in its discretion, and the
renewal of visitation rights and the residence of the mother and
children were not requirements to such disbursement, but mere
factors to be considered. The best interests of the children in such
funds were to control their disbursement.
In Fritschler,20 a judgment of divorce granted custody of two
minor children to the mother and stated that the children were not
to be removed from Wisconsin without permission from the court.
However, Mrs. Fritschler moved to Colorado with the children,
and later sought the court's permission for such an action; the
move was supported by reports of two social workers and a family
specialist who felt the move was in the best interests of both the
mother and the children. The response of the father was a motion
to transfer custody of the minor children to him. The mother and
children returned to Wisconsin for the hearing of these motions,
20. Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d 283, 208 N.W.2d 336 (1973).
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and the trial court declared both parents fit to have custody. The
mother was to continue to retain custody provided that the children
remain in Wisconsin; if Mrs. Fritschler did not wish to have cus-
tody of the children and remain in Wisconsin, then custody was to
be awarded to the father. Once again the mother left for Colorado
and the trial court suspended all support payments, granted cus-
tody to the father, and permitted the father to withhold a $5,000
alimony payment until the children were returned to Wisconsin.
When the trial court refused to vacate this order, Mrs. Fritschler
appealed.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court decision acknowledged that
reports of social workers were helpful in determining the best inter-
ests of children, but were by no means binding upon a trial court.
It felt the trial court had not abused its discretion by refusing to
accept the recommendations in these reports, which advocated the
mother's custody in Colorado of these children. The court pointed
out that divorced parents may not be free to move about without
restraint, if such movement is inconsistent with the best interests
of the children and the rights of the other parent. Movement in
light of such difficulties resulted in a forfeiture of rights of the
mother to the custody of the children. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court supported the lower court decision which granted custody to
the father and permitted him to withhold a $5,000 alimony pay-
ment until the children were returned to Wisconsin. However, due
to the Krause 2 decision, the suspension of support payments or-
dered by the lower court was reversed. This was due to the father's
continuing duty to support his children even though denied visita-
tion rights by a mother's actions in removing the children from the
jurisdiction of Wisconsin.
Alaimo v. Schwanz22 considered a different topic, that of an
action for alienation of affections. The jury by special verdict
found that the defendant had alienated the affections of the plain-
tiff's husband, and awarded compensatory damages of $15,000.
Upon the defendant's appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated
that this cause of action did not require the element of physical
separation of the spouses: "Conduct which indicates a diminution
of regard of one spouse for the other is sufficient to establish a loss
of affection." However, physical separation may be considered
21. Krause v. Krause, 58 Wis. 2d 499, 206 N.W.2d 589 (1973).
22. 56 Wis. 2d 198, 201 N.W.2d 604 (1972).
23. Id. at 201, 201 N.W.2d at 606.
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with the possibilities for reconciliation or improvement of the mar-
ital situation as factors in the jury determination of damages. Fac-
tors which may mitigate damages include the prior institution of
divorce proceedings and disputes involving physical violence be-
tween the spouses before the alleged alienation occurred.
In this case the supreme court felt the $15,000 damages
awarded by the jury were excessive, and reduced them to $10,000
as the highest reasonable amount at which the plaintiff's damages
could be set. This reduction of damages by the court under the
Powers24 rule gave the plaintiff the option of a new trial as to
damages only or to have judgment for the amount as reduced.
One case during the Term considered the topic of property
settlements in divorce actions. In Ray v. Ray,25 a husband and wife
agreed to a postnuptial settlement by which the wife would receive
$2,000 from the sale of certain jointly owned property. This agree-
ment was written by the husband's attorney and the wife was not
represented by counsel; the agreement was to settle all property
rights of the parties, including rights to future alimony. When the
wife sued for divorce, the husband requested incorporation of this
agreement in any subsequent judgment of divorce. The trial court
found the agreement to be valid, and felt it was unnecessary to
determine whether the plaintiff was adequately provided for under
the settlement agreement.
Upon appeal the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that Wis.
Stats. 247.1026 required approval of separation agreements to up-
hold the third party interests of the state in divorce cases. The court
made it clear that a trial court has a duty to examine such postnup-
tial agreements carefully; the case was remanded to the trial court
for a determination of the adequacy of the provisions made for the
wife.
The subject of paternity was considered in E--v.E-- .2 7 The
trial court granted a divorce and found as a fact in the judgment
that a child was the issue of the marriage; there was no objection
by the husband, but he was not represented by counsel at the trial.
The husband later sought an order to show cause to reconsider the
issue of paternity. At a hearing on the subject, the trial court found
24. Powers v. Allstate Ins. Co., 10 Wis. 2d 78, 102 N.W.2d 393 (1960).
25. 57 Wis. 2d 77, 203 N.W.2d 724 (1973).
26. WIs. STATS. § 247.10 (1971). ". . . [P]arties may, subject to the approval of the
court, stipulate for a division of estate, for alimony, or for the support of children, in case
a divorce or legal separation is granted or a marriage annulled."
27. 57 Wis. 2d 436, 204 N.W.2d 503 (1973).
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that the defendant indeed was not the natural father of the child,
and was not liable for support payments.
Upon the wife's appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed
the trial court decision and reinstated the original divorce judg-
ment. The issue of paternity of the child was res judicata between
the original parties to the divorce action, and the trial court may
not vacate or modify the original judgment as to this finding of
fact. The rationale for the decision was to give finality to divorce
judgments. The failure of the defendant to raise the issue of patern-
ity was not "excusable neglect" since the trial court had specifi-
cally questioned the defendant about this matter, and the defen-
dant was not granted relief from this divorce judgment.18
JOHN KNUTESON
INSURANCE LAW
I. CASES OF FIRST IMPRESSION
A. "Accident" or "Occurrence"
Although the words "accident" or "occurrence" are found in
most standard auto liability policies, it was not until this Term that
the Wisconsin Supreme Court was called upon to decide exactly
what was meant by such words; at least in reference to the extent
of an insurer's liability for damage. The case which attempted to
define these terms was Olsen v. Moore.' The defendant, Moore,
was driving east on 1-94 when he apparently lost control of his
vehicle, crossed over the center median, and collided first with an
automobile driven by Nancy Rauwald and then with an automo-
bile driven by Bruno Janekowski. The defendant was insured by
Badger State Mutual Casualty Co. which had issued a family com-
bination auto policy providing bodily injury liability in the maxi-
mum of $10,000 per injured person and .$20,000 per occurrence. 2
28. WIs. STATS. § 269.46 (1971).
1. 56 Wis. 2d 340, 202 N.W.2d 228 (1972).
2. The Badger State Policy read as follows:
Limits of Liability. The limit of bodily injury liability stated in the declarations as
applicable to 'each person' is the limit of the company's liability for all damages,
including damages for care and loss of services, arising out of bodily injury sustained
by one person as the result of any one occurrence; the limit of such liability stated
in the declarations as applicable to 'each occurrence' is, subject to the above provi-
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